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Abstract
Rapidly growing developing economies are characterized by heavy exportation and
current account surpluses. Empirical studies suggest that "learning-by-exporting" may
be quantitatively important in developing countries and behind some of this dramatic
growth. This paper explores if learning-by-exporting helps to explain key macroeco-
nomic behavior of fast growing developing countries. To accomplish this, I build a two
country general equilibrium growth model in which a developing economy benets from
learning-by-exporting as it trades with a developed economy. As the benchmark, I con-
sider a setup in which policies are restricted by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
to non-trade related policies and compare the outcome to a model with "No-WTO
restrictions". The optimal policies in the presence of WTO restrictions rationalize the
observed current account surpluses of rapidly growing developing economies. However,
if there were no WTO restrictions, developing countries would manipulate their terms
of trade rather than their current account, which improves the welfare of both develop-
ing and developed countries. This highlights the fact that terms of trade manipulation
can be "win-win" in the presence of learning-by-exporting. This paper also considers
a "Coordinated Policy" problem to obtain the rst-best outcome for the world. In this
setup, the developing countrys terms of trade deteriorate even further and it runs a
greater current account decit compared to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
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1 Introduction
Rapidly growing developing economiessuch as China and other Asian countriesare charac-
terized by heavy exportation1 and current account surpluses2. Fast growth with current
account surpluses contradicts a key prediction of the open-economy neoclassical growth
model: countries with faster productivity growth should receive more net capital inows
to fund investment and consumption smoothing. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) call this
inconsistency the "allocation puzzle". A consequence of these countries current account
surpluses is an increase in worldwide current account imbalances, so-called "global imbal-
ances". A similarity between these economies is heavy exportation, which led to a popular
view that export-led growth may be behind some of these dramatic Asian miracles. This is
supported by empirical micro studies which suggest that "learning-by-exporting" (exporters
productivity improvement resulting from increased exports) may be quantitatively large in
developing countries. This paper takes the popular view seriously and attempts to explore
if learning-by-exporting helps to explain key macroeconomic behavior of fast growing devel-
oping countries. This paper also examines what policies exploit learning-by-exporting, their
implications for aggregates like the current account and the real exchange rate, the welfare
consequences for the growing economy and the rest of the world, and if restricting the set of
policies to non-trade related policies matter.
In order to answer these questions, this paper builds up a two country general equilib-
rium growth model in which a developing economy benets from learning-by-exporting as it
trades with a developed economy. This positive externality from exporting provides an in-
centive for the developing country to increase its exports. The model is calibrated to match
relevant data moments of U.S. and China in 1991 and simulated for transition to steady
state. As the benchmark, I consider a setup in which policies are restricted by the World
1See Figure 1.
2See Figure 2.
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Trade Organization (WTO) to non-trade related policies.3 In this benchmark model, the
optimal policy for the country is to the tax non-traded goods consumption and subsidize
savings, which shifts labor into the tradable sector and suppresses consumption to increase
exports.4 These policies generate the simultaneous fast growth and current account sur-
pluses observed in the data, and improve the welfare of the developing country relative to a
"No Policy" competitive equilibrium. Following the optimal policyopposed to "No Policy"
allows the developing economy to obtain greater benets from learning-by-exporting which
leads to more rapid growth. However, the welfare change of the developed country between
the benchmark case and the "No Policy" economy is quantitatively negligible.
If there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country has an incentive to manipulate
its terms of trade rather than distort savings. Specically, the developing country subsidizes
exports to reduce its consumption of the export good and increase consumption of the
import good. This policy generates a large deterioration in the developing economys terms
of trade and reverses the prediction for its current account. In particular, the developing
economy now runs a current account decit as it no longer relies heavily on the savings
distortion to promote exports. This policy raises the welfare of both countries relative to
the benchmark model as it generates faster economic growth in the developing economy and
improvement of the terms of trade in the developed economy, highlighting the fact that terms
3Since the WTO is an organization designed to liberalize international trade, it forces countries to decrease
tari¤s and export subsidies. Therefore, the WTO prevents countries from manipulating their terms of trade.
The WTO restrictions in this model represent the general state of trade rules that prevent countries from
manipulating terms of trade. For instance, a country may not be able to manipulate its terms of trade if its
trading partner can implement trade policies in retaliation.
4This response is consistent with current Chinese government policies. The Chinese government is taxing
the gross revenue in the service sector (Business Tax), but in the manufacturing sector, they are taxing
the di¤erence between a commoditys price and its production cost (Value Added Tax). Ping, Liang, Hao,
Zhang, and Mao (2009) show that if the tax rate of the Business Tax is converted to a Value Added Tax, it is
18.2 %. This is greater than the Value Added Tax rate of 17 % that is applied to manufacturing. Therefore,
the Chinese government is taxing the service sector heavier than the manufacturing sector, thus the policy of
applying a non-traded goods consumption tax is consistent with Chinas tax regime. The optimal policy of
providing a savings subsidy is also consistent with Chinas policy of stockpiling a large amount of government
savings, which was 4.4% of GDP in 1992 and 10.8% in 2007 according to Ma and Yi (2010).
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of trade manipulation can be "win-win" in the presence of learning-by-exporting. This result
contrasts with Bagwell and Staiger (1999)s view that the WTO improves world welfare by
preventing zero-sum terms of trade manipulation. My paper shows that WTO restrictions
may reduce world welfare if we consider the positive externality in the developing country
from learning-by-exporting.
Note that the benchmark model and the No-WTO model assume a passive developed
economy. This paper also considers a "Coordinated Policy" problem to obtain the rst-best
outcome for the world. In this setup, the developing countrys terms of trade deteriorate even
further and it runs a greater current account decit relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions"
case. This large deterioration of the developing countrys terms of trade causes its real
exchange rate to be undervalued. These policies reduce welfare of the developing country
and increase that of the developed country relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
However, the welfare changes of both countries between the "Coordinated Policy" case and
the "No-WTO Restrictions" economy are quantitatively small.
This paper is motivated by three distinct lines of study. The rst consists of empirical
micro studies which show that learning-by-exporting may be quantitatively large in devel-
oping countries.5 A possible explanation is that exporters in developing countries improve
their productivity through imitation and technology spillover from developed countries.6 The
most di¢ cult task of these studies is controlling for the e¤ects of the unobserved di¤erences
in rm characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. In order to control for this
selection bias, Van Biesebroeck (2005) uses ethnicity of the owner and state ownership as
instruments, De Loecker (2007) uses matched sampling techniques based on an underlying
model of self-selection into export markets, and Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) use ex-
5These studies include Kraay (1999), Blalock and Gertler (2004), Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2010), Park,
Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) for East Asian countries, Van Biesebroeck (2005) for Aftrican countries, De
Loecker (2007), De Loecker (2013) for Slovenia, and Fernandes and Isgut (2009) for Colombia. Harrison and
Rodríguez-Clare (2010) provide extensive reviews of the above.
6Empirical micro studies point out that learning-by-exporting also comes from exportersimproved access
to advanced production technologies, technical assistance from foreign buyers, competition with foreign rms
and higher quality standards in international markets relative to domestic markets.
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ogenous rm specic exchange rate shocks as instruments. These studies nd signicant
evidence of learning-by-exporting after controlling for this selection bias. Another issue re-
garding learning-by-exporting is if it can be distinguished from learning-by-doing. Blalock
and Gertler (2004), Van Biesebroeck (2005), De Loecker (2007), and De Loecker (2013) show
that there is a jump in rmsproductivity accompanied by the initiation of exporting which
cannot be explained by learning-by-doing. One might also think that learning-by-importing
is as important as learning-by-exporting. According to Keller (2004), however, there has not
been a rm estimate of the quantitative importance of learning-by-importing.
The second literature addresses "global imbalances". Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
(2008) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) emphasize that the lack of nancial
assets in developing countries have generated capital outows. Fogli and Perri (2006) ar-
gue that the "great moderation" (a large reduction in U.S. business cycle volatility in the
early 1980s) has raised the U.S. current account decit by reducing their incentive to ac-
cumulate precautionary savings. However, as Aguiar and Amador (2011) point out, these
studies are silent on why Latin American countries had volatile business cycles and less de-
veloped nancial markets, yet ran current account decits. My paper provides an additional
explanation regarding "global imbalances" and suggests that Latin American countries ran
current account decits because they may implement policies that did not take advantage
of learning-by-exporting.
My paper is also related to the "allocation puzzle". Aguiar and Amador (2011) claim
that since capital will not be invested in a country with high debt, due to the risk of expro-
priation, only politically stable developing countries can grow by reducing sovereign debt and
attracting foreign capital. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) argue that the expansion
of e¢ cient private rms has made China grow rapidly. However, these rms are nancially
constrained and therefore must save for future investment, which generates Chinas cur-
rent account surplus. Guo and Perri (2010) and Song and Yang (2010) argue that a atter
cross-sectional age-income prole accompanied by fast growth leads to young households
saving more, which generates the developing countriescurrent account surpluses. My pa-
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per not only provides an additional explanation regarding this puzzle but also examines
the connection between growth, current account surplus and WTO restrictions. Further-
more, it explores the optimal polices in the presence of learning-by-exporting and welfare
consequences for developing and developed countries. Both of these exercises have not been
undertaken by previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model; Section
3 describes the calibration of the model; Section 4 discusses the results; Section 5 explains
a "Coordinated Policy" problem and its results; Section 6 does the welfare analysis; Section
7 does a sensitivity analysis on the degree of learning-by-exporting; Section 8 concludes my
ndings.
2 Model
I present a two country general equilibrium growth model. Time (t) is discrete and runs from
0 to innity. The North country, denoted by N; corresponds to a developed economy and
owns the most developed technology. The Norths human capital stock HN is assumed to
be constant, reecting that the North has fully exhausted productivity gains from learning-
by-exporting. The South country, denoted by S; representing a developing economy, has
an inferior technology HSt 2

HS0 ; H
N

. Given the assumption that HN is constant, only
the South country grows through learning-by-exporting as it trades with the North country.
Each country produces one non-traded commodity and both countries share two traded
goods (z 2 f1; 2g). There is also an international nancial market that buys and sells risk-
free bonds bit with a return denoted by 1 + rt. Each economy is populated by rms that
produce goods and workers who provide domestic rms with labor. Lastly, the South country
has a government that implements policies to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.
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2.1 Firms
Country i 2 fN;Sg rms in the trade goods sector use labor nit (z) to produce output yit (z)
according to a constant returns to scale production function
yit (z) = A
i
t (z)n
i
t (z) ; i 2 fN;Sg ; z 2 f1; 2g ;
where
Ait (1)  H it ; Ait (2) 
 
H it
1+
;  > 0:7
Labor productivity in the trade goods sector depends on each countrys human capital.
Since  is greater than zero, the second traded commoditys production is more human
capital intensive than the rst traded commoditys. The South country has a comparative
advantage in the rst traded commoditys production because it has less human capital
HSt < H
N :
ASt (2)
ASt (1)
=
 
HSt
1+
HSt
<
AN (2)
AN (1)
=
 
HN
1+
HN
:
Therefore, the South country exports the rst traded commodity. Labor is hired by the rms
in a competitive domestic labor market that clears at an equilibrium wage wit. Firms in the
traded goods sector maximize their prot
pt (z)A
i
t (z)n
i
t (z)  witnit (z) :
7Using aggregate data, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) show that the savings wedge is key in explaining
developing countries fast growth accompanied by current account surpluses. Since my paper looks at
questions related to the savings side and builds up the most parsimonious model to explain this puzzle, it
does not include capital. Rapidly growing developing countries, which run current accout surpluses, tend
to undergo a lot of investment but save even more. The saving side is particularly puzzling given the fast
growth. We have models of why there may be capital wedges (enforcement, for example), but few regarding
savings wedges. Including capital in the model will a¤ect the quantitative results, but the key mechanism
still stands that absent the ability to manipulate the terms of trade, learning-by-exporting calls for a savings
wedge.
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Since I assume a perfect competition in the traded goods sector, the law of one price holds.
Thus, the world price of traded commodity z is
pt(z)  w
i
t
Ait (z)
:
Since the South country produces the rst traded commodity and the North produces the
second traded commodity, the Souths domestic wage is
wSt =

pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)

:
A rm in the non-traded goods sector uses labor nit to produce output y
i
t according to a
constant returns to scale production function
yit = n
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg :
I assume that labor productivity in the non-traded goods sector is equal to one in both
countries because the focus is on productivity improvement in the traded goods sector.8 The
non-traded goods sector rm maximizes its prot
pitn
i
t   witnit:
Therefore, each countrys non-traded commodity price is
pNt = w
N
t = 1 and p
S
t = w
S
t :
The Norths non-traded commodity/ labor is the numeraire.
2.2 Domestic Workers
A representative worker supplies labor N i inelastically for domestic rms in both non-traded
and traded goods sectors, and can trade a risk-free bond bit from the international nancial
8Even if I allow the productivity in the non-traded commodity sector to di¤er across these two countries,
all the qualitative results carry through. If the North labor productivity in non-traded goods sector is greater
than that of the South, the North produces and consumes more non-traded goods than before, and all other
allocations do not change.
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market. The worker enjoys utility ows from consumption of the non-traded commodity
cit and two traded goods c
i
t (z), z 2 f1; 2g : The worker discounts the future utility with a
discount factor  2 (0; 1) and has preferences:
1X
t=0
tu(Cit);
where
u(Cit) 
(Cit)
1    1
1   ;
Cit 
 
cit
1   cit (1)  cit (2)(1 ) ;  2 (0; 1) ;  2 (0; 1) :
Note that Cobb-Douglas preferences feature a unit elasticity of substitution across the non-
traded commodity and two traded goods. With this form of utility function, the expenditure
share on traded goods is  . Within traded goods, the proportions of the rst and second
traded commodity are  and 1  , respectively. The South countrys real exchange rate is
eSt 
P St
PNt
=

pSt
pNt
1  
=
 
wSt
1  
=

pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)
1  
;
where
P it 

pit
1   
1  
pt (1)
 
 
pt (2)
(1  ) 
(1 ) 
; i 2 fN;Sg :
Since the law of one price holds in the traded goods sector, the South countrys real exchange
rate is dened by the ratio of each countrys non-traded commodity price.
I assume that the North does not levy taxes, so the representative worker in the North
country maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint:
cNt + pt(1)c
N
t (1) + pt(2)c
N
t (2) + b
N
t+1 = N
N + (1 + rt) b
N
t :
However, the representative worker in the South country maximizes utility subject to a
budget constraint:
 
1 + NTt

pSt c
S
t +
 
1 + EXt

pt(1)c
S
t (1)+pt(2)c
S
t (2)+b
S
t+1+Tt = w
S
t N
S +f1 + (1 +  rt ) rtg bSt :
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The South government can tax or subsidize non-traded commodity consumption
 
NTt

,
exporting commodity consumption
 
EXt

, and/ or domestic savings ( rt ). In addition, the
government can use a lump-sum tax or transfer (Tt).9 Without loss of generality, I normalize
taxes on imports to zero.10
For the benchmark, I consider a setup in which the policies are restricted by the WTO
to non-trade related policies. Thus, in the benchmark model, I assume EXt = 0: This means
that the South government cannot directly subsidize exports or manipulate its terms of trade
pt(1)
pt(2)

. Then, I will compare the results of the benchmark model to those of a "No Policy"
competitive equilibrium
 
NTt = 
EX
t = 
r
t = Tt = 0

and the "No-WTO Restrictions" case
in which the South government can tax or subsidize exporting commodity consumption 
EXt 6= 0

.
2.3 Law of Motion for South Human Capital
I assume the North has exhausted learning-by-exporting, so only the South country grows
through learning-by-exporting as it trades with the North country. Two common ndings in
empirical micro studies on learning-by-exporting are that an exporters productivity improves
as their value of exports grows, and this export-productivity relationship becomes stronger
as rms export to relatively more developed countries. On the basis of these evidences, I
model the degree of learning-by-exporting as an increasing function of both the South value
of exports and the di¤erence in human capital stocks between North and South. Thus, the
law of motion for South human capital is
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


| {z }; (1)
"Learning-by-Exporting"
9I am primarily interested in the long run trend of the past 20 years. Since monetary policy is neutral in
the long run, I focus on scal policies.
10Without loss of generality, the South government taxes only consumers. The government can use the
full set of taxes, and this is not the only way to decentralize the system. Assume that the South workers do
not have access to the international nancial market and its government trades a risk-free bond bit on behalf
of workers. The model implications for key macroeconomic variables do not change.
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where
EXSt  max
 
ySt (1)  cSt (1)

; 0
	
:
The Souths human capital can grow up to HN , where  2 (0; 1) 11; through learning-by-
exporting.12 The di¤erence between North and South human capital stocks is then repre-
sented by
 
HN  HSt

:13 The value of South exports
 
EXSt

is the rst traded commodity
exports. If there is productivity improvement from the second traded commodity exports,
the South country exports both traded goods in the steady state. In order to exclude this
extreme case, the degree of learning-by-exporting from the second traded commodity exports
is set at zero. The parameter  > 0 governs the degree of learning-by-exporting, which is a
decreasing function of :
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of a set of quantities

cit; c
i
t(z); b
i
t; H
S
t
	
; a set of prices
fpit; pt(z); wit; rtg, and a set of taxes

NTt ; 
EX
t ; 
r
t ; Tt
	
, where i 2 fN;Sg and z 2 f1; 2g,
such that:
1. given prices and taxes, workers maximize utilities
2. given prices, rms maximize prots
3. the South human capital evolves according to the law of motion stated in equation (1)
4. the South government budget constraint is satised:
NTt p
S
t c
S
t + 
EX
t pt(1)c
S
t (1) + Tt = 
r
trtb
S
t
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11If  is equal to one, the comparative advantage disappears at the steady state
 
HSt = H
N

. Therefore,
the steady state is indeterminant.
12The functional form that I use for the law of motion for South human capital does not allow the South
human capital
 
HSt

to converge to HN in nite periods. Therefore, I consider that this model economy
arrives at the steady state when the South human capital
 
HSt

reaches 99% of HN .
13Note that the Souths learning-by-exporting depends on the di¤erence in human capital stocks between
North and South. If the North human capital grows over time, the Souths productivity gains from learning-
by-exporting are not exhausted. The South cannot converge to steady state.
14Without loss of generality, I assume that the government runs a balanced budget using a lump-sum tax
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5. goods markets clear:
cit = y
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg ;
cNt (z) + c
S
t (z) = y
N
t (z) + y
S
t (z) ; z 2 f1; 2g
6. labor markets clear:
nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2) = N
i; i 2 fN;Sg
7. bond market clears:
bSt + b
N
t = 0:
2.5 Ramsey Problem
The South government recognizes the law of motion for its human capital and implements
policies in order to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.15 The South governments
problems in the benchmark model and the "No-WTO Restrictions" case are the Ramsey
problem of choosing a competitive equilibrium to maximize the South workers utility, given
HS0 and b
S
0 . Following the primal approach to the Ramsey problem (Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1997)), I formulate the South governments problems as if the government chooses an
allocation, subject to constraints, that ensure the existence of prices and taxes such that the
selected allocation is consistent with the optimizing behavior of workers and rms.
2.5.1 Benchmark
The allocation selected by the South government has to satisfy the law of motion for South
human capital, both countriesdomestic labor markets clearing conditions, and all goods
markets clearing conditions. In addition to these standard constraints, the allocation should
or transfer (Tt).
15Note that rms do not internalize learning-by-exporting in this model. If rms recognize learning-by-
exporting, the only thing rms can do to take advantage of learning-by-exporting is dumping. However, rms
cannot use dumping because of the WTO restrictions. Therefore, a governments macroeconomic policy is
essential to get the full benet from learning-by-exporting.
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also satisfy: (i) the North workers optimality conditions and present-value budget constraint,
(ii) the optimality conditions of the North rms, and (iii) WTO restrictions.
The North representative worker solves:
max
1X
t=0
tu(CNt );
subject to
1X
t=0
 
tY
i=0
1
1 + ri
!
  cNt + pt(1)  cNt (1) + pt(2)  cNt (2) NN = bN0 :
Therefore, the North workers optimality conditions are:
ucNt+1
ucNt
=
1
1 + rt+1
;
ucNt (z)
ucNt
= pt(z); z 2 f1; 2g ;
where ucNt (z) is the North workers marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity
z 2 f1; 2g ; and ucNt is the North workers marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded
commodity.
Note that the North workers optimality conditions and present-value budget constraint
are summarized as the following implementability condition:
1X
t=0
t

ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN

= ucN0  bN0 :16
This implies that any competitive equilibrium must satisfy the North implementability con-
dition, and any allocation that satises this condition and goods market clearing conditions
can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
The optimality conditions of the North rms are summarized as follows:
if pt(z) =
ucNt (z)
ucNt
<
1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z) = 0;
if pt(z) =
ucNt (z)
ucNt
=
1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z) > 0; z 2 f1; 2g :
16See the appendix for the derivation of the implementability condition.
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The rms in the Norths traded goods sector do not produce the traded commodity z if its
world price pt(z) is less than the rmsunit labor cost 1ANt (z)
.
The WTO restrictions are represented by
ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
ucNt (1)
ucNt (2)
:
Since the South government cannot directly subsidize exports or manipulate terms of trade
in the benchmark model, the Souths domestic relative price of the export good to import
good

pt(1)
pt(2)

is equal to the world price.
Therefore, the South governments problem in the benchmark model17 is formulated as
follows: the South government solves
max
1X
t=0
tu(CSt );
subject to
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


;
N i = nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2); c
i
t = n
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg ;
cNt (z) + c
S
t (z) = A
N
t (z)n
N
t (z) + A
S
t (z)n
S
t (z);
ucNt (z)
ucNt
 1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z)  0; nSt (z)  0; z 2 f1; 2g ;
1X
t=0
t

ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN

= ucN0  bN0 ;
ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
ucNt (1)
ucNt (2)
:
2.5.2 No WTO Restrictions
If there were no WTO restrictions, the allocation chosen by the South government has to sat-
isfy all constraints of the benchmark model above except the last equation

u
cSt (1)
u
cSt (2)
=
u
cNt (1)
u
cNt (2)

.
Therefore, the "No-WTO Restrictions" problem drops the last constraint which implies the
South government can manipulate terms of trade. Consequentially, the Souths domestic
17See the appendix for the computation algorithm used to solve the benchmark model.
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relative price of the export good to import good

pt(1)
pt(2)

can be di¤erent from the world
price.
3 Calibration
This section explains how I set parameter values of the benchmark model economy. I inter-
pret the North country as the U.S. and the South country as China. A set of parameters
are adopted from related literature and the U.S. data. The model period is one year. The
discount factor  is set at 0:96; which implies 4% real interest rate per annum at the steady
state, and the preference parameter ; which determines the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, is set at 2: The expenditure share on traded goods  is 0:2438; which is the average
U.S. GDP share of traded goods sector18 from 1991 to 200719 and the parameter  is set
at 0:551620 so that the expenditure share on the rst traded commodity ( ) matches the
average U.S. imports to GDP ratio from 1991 to 2007 (0:1345) 21: The parameter ; which
determines the Souths human capital at the steady state, is 0:99 in order to prevent multiple
solutions.22 Both the North
 
NN

and the Souths
 
NS

labor is normalized to 1, and the
Souths initial debt
 
bS0

is set at 0.
The remaining parameters are chosen so that the model can replicate relevant data mo-
ments of the U.S. and China. The Souths initial human capital HS0 , the Norths human
capital HN , and the parameter ; which governs the labor productivity in the second traded
18Following Stockman and Tesar (1995), the traded goods sector includes agricultural, manufacturing,
mining, retail, and transportation sectors.
19Data Source: BEA.
20This is a lower bound of the rst traded commoditys expenditure share in traded goods consumption,
because I assume that the U.S. does not produce imported goods. A sensitivity analysis found that the main
results are robust to the value of parameter :
21Data Source: World Development Indicators.
22If  is equal to one, the comparative advantage disappears at the steady state
 
HSt = H
N

; leading to
multiple solutions. The parameter  determines the Souths human capital at the steady state. If we reduce
the value of , the Souths steady state human capital decreases and the growth rate of its human capital
declines because of the reduced di¤erence between the maximum benet to human capital the South can
receive by exporting to the more productive North and its current human capital. All the qualitative results
are still valid.
15
commoditys production, are selected so that the model matches three targets: (i) Chinas
labor productivity of its manufacturing industry relative to its service industry in 1991
(0:5269) 23; (ii) the U.S. labor productivity of its manufacturing industry relative to Chinas
in 1991 (44:1379) 24; and (iii) the U.S. relative labor productivity of its exporters in 1992
(1:169) calculated by Bernard and Jensen (1999). The parameter , which governs the de-
gree of learning-by-exporting, is chosen so that the model matches the average growth rate
of Chinas real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. from 1991 to 2007 (0:0752) 25. The degree
of learning-by-exporting under this calibration implies that if the South countrys exports
increase by 10%, its productivity rises by 11:91%. This is in line with micro estimates for
China.26 I use the same specication for the "No-Policy" and "No-WTO Restrictions" cases.
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
4 Results
This section explains the quantitative results and is organized as follows: Subsection 4.1 ex-
plains the results of the benchmark model and compares them to the observed data patterns;
Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of the "No-Policy" economy and the "No-WTO
Restrictions" case in comparison with those of the benchmark, respectively.
4.1 Benchmark
The period 0 corresponds to the year 1991. When the South government cannot use an
export subsidy
 
EXt = 0

due to WTO restrictions, the optimal policy for the South country
is to tax the non-traded goods consumption and subsidize savings as shown in Figure 3.
This shifts labor into the tradable sector and suppresses the Souths overall consumption to
increase its exports. Figure 4 shows that the South government initially shifts labor into the
23Data Source: World Development Indicators and Banister (2005).
24Data Source: BEA, World Development Indicators, and Banister (2005).
25Data Source: Penn World Table.
26For instance, Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) show that if a Chinese rm experiences an exogenous
10% increase in exports, its productivity rises by 11% to 13% in China.
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tradable sector by suppressing consumption of the non-traded commodity. As the Souths
human capital grows through learning-by-exporting, it gradually raises its labor allocation
to the non-traded commodity sector and therefore its consumption. Figure 5 shows that
the South government suppresses consumption of the export good (Traded Commodity 1)
while reducing that of the import good (Traded Commodity 2) for the initial periods. This
raises the Souths exports, leading its human capital and real GDP to grow rapidly through
learning-by-exporting as shown in Figures 4 and 6. The transition to the steady state takes
112 periods, during which the North produces both traded goods and the South produces
the rst traded commodity.27
The initial pattern of exports and imports of the South causes the country to run a
current account surplus, accompanied by rapid growth in its real GDP as shown in Figure
6.28 During the transitional phase, the Souths terms of trade stay constant. Note that
when one country produces both traded goods, the terms of trade are determined by its pro-
ductivity ratio between the two traded goodsproduction. Since the North produces both
traded goods for all periods, the Souths terms of trade are equal to the Norths produc-
tivity ratio between two traded goods

pt(1)
pt(2)
=
(HN)
1+
HN

. This is equal to the U.S. relative
labor productivity of exporters in 1992 (1:169). The constant Souths terms of trade makes
the Souths real exchange rate appreciate as its human capital grows. This is because the
Souths real exchange rate is a function of its terms of trade and relative productivity in
the traded commoditys production

eSt 
n
pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)
o1  
. Simultaneous growth
and real exchange rate appreciation is consistent with the Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964)
27As I describe in Subsections 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2, the South produces the second traded commodity during
the latter part of the transition in the "No Policy", "No-WTO Restrictions", and "Coordinated Policy"
cases. This is because initially the South runs a substantial current account decit. In order to repay the
interest on its debt, the South shifts more workers from non-tradable sector to both tradable sectors so that
it runs a trade surplus for the rest of the transition periods.
28As can be seen in Figure 2, Chinas current account surplus has increased over time. However, in this
model, the Souths current account surplus is decreasing over time. The Chinese government could have
gradually implemented policies to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. However, since this is a perfect
foresight model, the South does not gradually implement policies. In order to match the trend, I should
introduce some frictions like adjustment costs into this model.
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hypothesis29.
Table 2 summarizes the average values of key aggregates of U.S. and China from 1991 to
2007 and their counterparts in the benchmark model. The model is calibrated to match the
average growth rate of Chinas real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. (7:52%). As shown
in Table 2, the Souths policies generate the simultaneous fast growth and current account
surpluses observed in the data.30 In addition, the benchmark model replicates both Chinas
export over GDP and the appreciation of its real exchange rate as in the data.
4.2 No Policy Counterfactual
In the "No-Policy" economy, both rms and workers know that the Souths human capital
will grow over time but no one recognizes its law of motion. Therefore, the South government
has no incentive to raise the Souths exports in order to take advantage of learning-by-
exporting. If no policies were implemented in both the North and South countries, the
transition to the steady state takes 118 periods as shown in Figure 7. This is 6 periods
longer than that of the benchmark economy because no one implements policies to accelerate
the Souths growth through learning-by-exporting in the "No-Policy" economy. During the
transition, the patterns of specialization in production undergo three stages: (i) the North
produces both traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity for the rst
96 periods; (ii) both countries are completely specialized in period 97; and (iii) the South
starts to produce the second traded commodity, in addition to the rst traded commodity,
in period 98.
Figure 7 shows that more South workers produce in the non-traded commodity sector for
the initial 85 periods relative to the benchmark case, because the Souths labor productivity
29Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) argue that economic growth driven by productivity gains in the
traded goods sector should accompany a real exchange rate appreciation.
30This model overstates Chinas current account surplus and understates the U.S. current account decit.
However, what is important is that the model can qualitatively replicate the sign of current accounts of both
countries. In reality, both countries have other trading partners than each other. The discrepancy between
current account generated by the model and its data counterpart may come from each countrys trade with
the rest of the world.
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in the rst traded commoditys production is much less than that in the non-traded com-
moditys production over the same periods. This initially suppresses the Souths rst traded
commoditys exports although its consumption for the rst traded commodity is less than
in the benchmark economy as shown in Figure 8, delaying the take-o¤ of its human capital
relative to the benchmark case.
Since the South workers know that their income will grow in the future, they want to raise
current consumption. The South consumes more non-traded goods in the rst 85 periods
than in the benchmark economy, leading to a larger aggregate consumption. This makes the
Souths current account decit31 increase for the same periods. The South workers move
from the non-tradable sector to both tradable sectors for the rest of the transition periods
so that the South runs a trade surplus in order to repay the interest on its debt.32 Since
more workers produce in both traded commodity sectors in the South country relative to the
benchmark economy beginning in period 86, the level of South real GDP becomes greater
than that in the benchmark case as Figure 9 presents. This is because labor productivity
in the traded goods production is higher than that in non-traded commodity production
over the same period. Figure 9 shows that the South terms of trade start to deteriorate in
period 97 when both countries are completely specialized.33 Beginning in period 98 when
the South produces both traded goods, its terms of trade, which are equal to the South
productivity ratio

(HSt )
1+
HSt

; improve as its human capital grows. For the same period,
the real exchange rate appreciates following the Souths human capital growth.
4.3 No WTO Restrictions
If there were no WTO restrictions
 
EXt 6= 0

, the South country can directly subsidize
exports. Figure 10 shows that the transition to the steady state takes 71 periods but most of
31The size of the current account decits is implausible. This is caused by the full commitment and perfect
foresight assumptions.
32The right panel of Figure 8 shows that the South exports even the second traded commodity from period
100 despite a comparative disadvantage.
33The South terms of trade in the benchmark model is normalized to 1 in Figures 9, 12, and 16.
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the catch-up takes place in the rst 50 periods. During transition, the North produces both
traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity for the rst 26 periods. As
the Souths human capital grows, it gradually expands the world market share of the rst
traded commodity. In period 27, the South completely takes over the market for the rst
traded commodity, which leads to complete specialization of both countries until period 35.
The South starts to produce the second traded commodity in period 36.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 11, the South government suppresses consumption of
the export good (Traded Commodity 1) to a larger degree during the transition relative to
benchmark outcomes. This raises the Souths exports, making its human capital grow at an
even faster rate through learning-by-exporting relative to the benchmark economy. Figure 10
shows that, compared to the benchmark, the South government shifts more workers from the
non-traded commodity sector to both traded goods sectors. Since labor productivity in both
traded goodsproduction is higher than that in the non-traded commoditys production,
the level of South real GDP in "No-WTO Restrictions" case is greater than that in the
benchmark economy beginning in period 11. The right panel of Figure 11 shows that the
South substitutes the alternative imports by raising consumption of the import good (Traded
Commodity 2) substantially for the initial periods. As the South accumulates human capital
through learning-by-exporting, its imports decline to a level which is even below that in the
benchmark after period 36when the South starts to produce the second traded commodity.
The Souths increased imports initially cause the country to run a large current account
decit. As the Souths imports decline, the current account decit also goes down and
ultimately becomes balanced in the steady state. The South governments export subsidy
generates a deterioration in its terms of trade

pt(1)
pt(2)

beginning in period 27 when both
countries start to be completely specialized, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 12. When
the North produces both traded goods for the initial 26 periods, the Souths terms of trade
are equal to the Norths productivity ratio between two traded goods

(HN)
1+
HN

, which
is time-invariant. When the South produces both traded goods beginning in period 36, its
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terms of trade are equivalent to its productivity ratio

(HSt )
1+
HSt

; thus both rise with an
increase in the Souths human capital.
Figure 13 shows that if there were no WTO restrictions, the South country will use an
export subsidy for the initial 35 periods instead of a non-traded commodity consumption tax,
and it no longer relies heavily on the savings subsidy to promote exports. The switch of sign
in the current account from the benchmark to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case implies that,
ideally, the South would like to manipulate its terms of trade rather than its current account.
However, if the ability to explicitly subsidize exports is absent due to WTO restrictions, it
must "over" distort both the intertemporal margin and the non-traded margin.
5 Coordinated Policy Problem
In this section, I consider a "Coordinated Policy" problem in which the North and South
could coordinate policies in order to obtain the rst-best outcome for the world. I assume
that there is a ctitious world planner who maximizes the weighted average of both the
North and South utilities by taking advantage of the South countrys learning-by-exporting.
The world planner solves
max
1X
t=0
t

u(CSt ) + (1  )u(CNt )
	
;
subject to
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


;
cit = n
i
t; N
i = nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2); i 2 fN;Sg ;
cSt (z) + c
N
t (z) = A
S
t (z)n
S
t (z) + A
N (z)nNt (z);
nSt (z)  0; nNt (z)  0; z 2 f1; 2g ;
where  2 [0; 1] is the South countrys Pareto weight.
If the South country exports the traded commodity z 2 f1; 2g, the world utility maxi-
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mizing behavior of the planner implies the following rst-order conditions:
ucSt (z)  
t
 
HN  HSt


exp

 EX
S
t


= (1  )ucNt (z); (2)
ucSt (z)  ASt (z) = ucSt ; (3)
where t is a multiplier for the law of motion for South human capital, ucit(z) is the country
is marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity z; and ucit is the country
is marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded commodity. Note that the second
term in the left side of the condition (2),
t(HN HSt )

exp

 EXSt


; which appears due to
learning-by-exporting, is positive. This implies that when the South country exports the
traded commodity z, the world planner reduces the South countrys consumption for the
exporting good cSt (z) in order to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. Condition (3)
shows that there is no distortion between the Souths consumption for the export good and
that of non-traded good. If a worker shifts from the non-traded commodity sector to the
traded commodity z sector in the South country, this reduces one unit of the non-traded
commodity. Thus, the welfare loss is the marginal utility of consumption for the non-traded
commodity. However, the worker produces ASt (z) units of the traded commodity z. By
consuming these units, the worker can enjoy their marginal utility of consumption for the
commodity times their marginal product
 
ASt (z)

. Since the South country does not export
the traded commodity z but consumes it, there is no additional welfare gain from learning-by-
exporting.34 The conditions (2) and (3) imply that the planner decreases not only the South
countrys consumption for the export good but also that for non-traded good. This means
that the planner raises the Souths exports by reducing its consumption of domestically
produced goods and increasing consumption of the import good.
34Note that a non-traded goods consumption tax is needed in the presence of WTO restrictions. If a
worker shifts from the non-traded commodity sector to the export commodity sector in the South country,
this reduces one unit of the non-traded commodity. Thus, the welfare loss is marginal utility of consumption
for the non-traded commodity. However, the worker produces the marginal product of the export commodity,
and consumes part of that while exporting the remaining part to increase their consumption of the import
commodity. This way, the terms of trade are kept constant. Since the South country still exports some of
the additional export commodity, there is additional welfare gain from learning-by-exporting.
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5.1 Decentralization
In this subsection, I explain the way I nd prices and wedges, which imply the rst-best
allocation for the world. The North countrys non-traded commodity price is normalized to
one. Since the Norths relative consumption across goods is undistorted, I use their marginal
rate of substitution between non-traded and each respective traded good as world prices.
That is, the world price pt(z) of traded commodity z is dened by
pt(z) 
ucNt (z)
ucNt
; z 2 f1; 2g ;
where ucNt (z) is the North countrys marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity
z and ucNt is the Norths marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded commodity. The
world interest rate rt+1 is dened by
rt+1 
ucNt
  ucNt+1
  1:
Since the South country has a comparative advantage in the rst traded commoditys pro-
duction, it produces the rst traded commodity and the North produces the second traded
commodity. Therefore, the Souths domestic wage is dened by
wSt 

pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)

= pSt :
A wedge  rt+1 in the South countrys domestic interest rate, a wedge 
EX
t in the Souths
domestic relative price of the export good to import good, and a wedge NTt in the Souths
domestic relative price of the export good to non-traded good are dened by
 rt+1 
wSt+1  ucSt
rt+1  wSt    ucSt+1
  1
rt+1
  1 () w
S
t+1  ucSt
wSt    ucSt+1
  1 =  1 +  rt+1 rt+1;
EXt 
pt(2)  ucSt (1)
pt(1)  ucSt (2)
  1 () ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
 
1 + EXt

pt(1)
pt(2)
;
NTt 
ucSt
ASt (1)  ucSt (1)
  1 () ucSt (1)
ucSt
=
pt(1)
(1 + NTt ) p
S
t
=
1
(1 + NTt )A
S
t (1)
:
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5.2 Results
I use the same parameters for the "Coordinated Policy" case as in the benchmark economy,
except for the South Pareto weight,  = 0:3283; which is chosen so that the model matches
the balanced steady state current account.35
When both the North and South coordinate policies to achieve the world best allocation,
the transition to the steady state takes 64 periods as Figure 14 presents. This is 7 periods
less than that of "No-WTO Restrictions" economy because the world planner facilitates
growth through terms of trade distortion even more. During the transition, the patterns of
specialization in production undergo three stages, as before: (i) the North produces both
traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity for the rst 25 periods; (ii)
both countries are completely specialized from period 26 to 35; and (iii) the South starts to
produce the second traded commodity in period 36. The rst stage gets shorter relative to
the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
The left panel of Figure 15 shows that the world planner reduces the Souths consumption
of the export good (Traded Commodity 1) even more from period 16 than in the "No-
WTO Restrictions" economy. This increases the Souths exports, making its human capital
grow more rapidly through learning-by-exporting than in the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
As can be seen in Figure 14, the world planner moves more workers from the non-traded
commodity sector to both traded commodity sectors in the South country relative to the
"No-WTO Restrictions" economy beginning in period 16. This makes the level of South real
GDP greater than that in the "No-WTO Restrictions" case over the same period because
labor productivity in the traded goods production is higher than that in the non-traded
commoditys production. The right panel of Figure 15 shows that, for initial periods, the
world planner raises the Souths imports by 42% of its GDP relative to the "No-WTO
Restrictions" world by increasing its consumption of the import good (Traded Commodity
2).
35If  is greater than 0:3283, the South runs a current account decit at the steady state. If  is less than
0:3283, it runs a current account surplus at the steady state.
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This di¤erence in the Souths imports between "Coordinated Policy" and "No-WTO
Restrictions" economies initially leads to a larger current account decit (42% of the South
GDP) relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case. Figure 16 shows that beginning in
period 26, when both countries start to be completely specialized, the increase of the Souths
exports deteriorate its terms of trade

pt(1)
pt(2)

much more than in the "No-WTO Restrictions"
economy. This large deterioration of the Souths terms of trade causes its real exchange rate
to be undervalued from period 26 to 35, as shown in Figure 16. Over the same period, the
South countrys real GDP grows rapidly due to the fast growth of its human capital, which
implies a rapid productivity improvement in traded goods sector. Growth accompanied
with real exchange rate undervaluation contrasts with the prediction of the Balassa (1964)-
Samuelson (1964) hypothesis. When the South produces both traded goods beginning in
period 36, its terms of trade

pt(1)
pt(2)
=
(HSt )
1+
HSt

improve due to the growth of South human
capital. For the same period, the real exchange rate appreciates following the real GDP
growth. This implies that the world planner postpones the Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964)
e¤ect by deteriorating the South terms of trade.
Figure 17 shows that the world planner uses a bigger export subsidy and a less saving
subsidy relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case. This implies that the world planner
calls for more terms of trade manipulation than suggested by No-WTO policies.
6 Welfare Analysis
This paper explores optimal policies in the presence of learning-by-exporting in various
environments: with WTO restrictions, with no restrictions, and under policy coordination.
An interesting question to ask is what implications these policies have for developing and
developed countrieswelfare. In order to answer this question, I measure the welfare changes
resulting from moving from the benchmark economy with WTO restrictions to an alternative
case. This is accomplished by nding the percentage change in per-period consumption that
I should give to a worker in each country in the benchmark such that the worker is indi¤erent
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between the two environments.
In the "No-Policy" economy, the South country is not aware of the positive externality
from learning-by-exporting, thus no policy is implemented to facilitate export-led growth.
On the other hand, in the benchmark model, the South government recognizes learning-by-
exporting and has an incentive to implement policies to increase exports. Since it cannot
directly subsidize exports due to WTO restrictions, it alternatively taxes the non-traded
goods consumption and subsidizes savings. This policy enables the South country to grow
faster, benetting its workers, than in the "No-Policy" world. Conversely, moving from the
"No-Policy" world to the benchmark economy slightly decreases the welfare of the North
country. As can be seen in Table 3, moving from the benchmark to a "No-Policy" economy
results in welfare changes equivalent to a 19:12% decline and 0:06% increase in per-period
consumption of the South and the North, respectively.
If the South country is allowed to manipulate its terms of trade ("No-WTO Restrictions"
case), both the North and South benet from welfare improvement relative to the benchmark
economy. Without restrictions on policies, the South country subsidizes exports to both
reduce its consumption of the export good and increase consumption of the import good.
This policy generates a large deterioration in the Souths terms of trade and a current account
decit. This policy makes the South grow faster without raising savings heavily to promote
exports, which improves the welfare of the South relative to the benchmark economy. In
the "No-WTO Restrictions" world, the Norths welfare also increases due to improved terms
of trade compared with the benchmark economy. This "win-win" outcome through terms
of trade manipulation is reected in the positive welfare gains of 14:05% and 0:45% in per-
period consumption of the South and North, respectively.36 This is contrary to Bagwell and
Staiger (1999)s view that the WTO improves world welfare by preventing zero-sum terms
36Although the South country is a small open economy that cannot a¤ect world prices, the South gov-
ernment can manipulate its internal terms of trade (the relative price of its exporting goods to importing
goods in the South domestic markets) and grow rapidly through learning-by-exporting. However, the Norths
welfare does not increase because its terms of trade are not changed by the Souths economic policies.
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of trade manipulation.37
As shown in Table 3, if both countries coordinate policies to achieve the rst-best alloca-
tion, both countrieswelfare rises signicantly compared with the benchmark economy. The
ctitious world planner manipulates the terms of trade of both countries so that the South
grows faster through learning-by-exporting. This leads to increased welfare gains equivalent
to 13:16% and 1:22% in per-period consumption of the South and North, respectively. How-
ever, moving from the "No-WTO Restrictions" economy to the "Coordinated Policy" world,
the North is better o¤ whereas the South is worse o¤. The world planner pulls down the
relative price of the Souths export good to its import good even further than the "No-WTO
Restrictions" economy. Even though this makes the South country grow faster, the larger
deterioration of the Souths terms of trade hurts its welfare. On the other hand, the North
benets from its improved terms of trade. However, the welfare changes of both countries
moving from the "No-WTO Restrictions" case to the "Coordinated Policy" economy are
quantitatively modest, resulting in a 0:79% decrease for the South and 0:78% increase for
the North.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
Recall that I calibrate my model such that the South and North emulate China and U.S.,
respectively. I end the paper by seeing how sensitive responses of China (South) and U.S.
(North) are to the degree of learning-by-exporting. The degree of learning-by-exporting
is measured by a rise in a rms productivity accompanied by a 10% increase in exports.
According to Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010), a rms productivity increases by 11% to
13% in China if it experiences an exogenous 10% rise in exports. Table 4 shows that if I
use 8:82% on the degree of learning-by-exporting, the benchmark model still generates the
simultaneous growth and current account surplus in China. However, the levels of both the
37There may be other reasons that WTO restrictions improve the welfare of developing countries. For
instance, Bajona and Chu (2010) claim that WTO restrictions increase Chinas welfare by reducing subsidies
to the ine¢ cient state-owned sector.
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average growth rate of Chinas relative real GDP per capita and its current account over
GDP decrease relative to the benchmark calibration. If the degree of learning-by-exporting
is one tenth of the highest value of the micro estimate, that is 1:30%, the South does not
need to run a current account surplus to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. This result
shows that the cross-country di¤erences in the degree of learning-by-exporting may explain
the heterogeneity in the pattern of current accounts across developing countries.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines if learning-by-exporting rationalizes key macroeconomic behavior of
fast growing developing countries. I also explore what policies exploit learning-by-exporting,
their implications for aggregates such as the current account and the real exchange rate, the
welfare consequences for developing and developed economies, and if restricting the set of
policies to non-trade related policies matter.
In order to answer these questions, this paper builds a two country general equilibrium
growth model in which a developing economy benets from learning-by-exporting as it trades
with a developed economy. If policies are restricted by the WTO to non-trade related
policies, the optimal policy for the developing country is to tax their non-traded goods
consumption and subsidize savings, which rationalizes the observed current account surpluses
of rapidly growing developing economies. This policy improves the welfare of developing
country relative to a "No-Policy" competitive equilibrium.
If there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country optimizes by directly sub-
sidizing exports, generating a large deterioration in their terms of trade and reversing the
response of their current account from surplus to decit. Optimizing in this fashion raises
the welfare of both countries relative to the model with WTO restrictions, as it generates
faster economic growth in the developing economy and improvement of the terms of trade
in the developed economy. I also consider a Coordinated Policy problem to obtain the
rst-best outcome for the world. In this setup, the developing countrys terms of trade de-
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teriorate even further and it runs a greater current account decit relative to the No-WTO
Restrictionscase.
The model not only provides an additional explanation regarding "global imbalances"
but also allows me to investigate the connection between growth, current account surplus
and WTO restrictions. Lastly, unlike previous studies, I also explore optimal policies in
the presence of learning-by-exporting, and welfare implications for countries under di¤erent
regimes.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Implementability Condition
The North representative worker solves:
max
1X
t=0
tu(CNt );
subject to
1X
t=0
 
tY
i=0
1
1 + ri
!
  cNt + pt(1)  cNt (1) + pt(2)  cNt (2) NN = bN0 : (4)
The workers rst order conditions are:
ucNt+1
ucNt
=
1
1 + rt+1
;
ucNt (z)
ucNt
= pt(z); z 2 f1; 2g :
Plugging the above rst order conditions into the North workers present-value budget con-
straint (4) yields
1X
t=0
 
tY
i=1
ucNi
ucNi 1
!

 
cNt +
ucNt (1)
ucNt
 cNt (1) +
ucNt (2)
ucNt
 cNt (2) NN
!
= bN0 :
Since ucNi s; i 2 f1; 2;    ; t  1g are canceled out in
 
tY
i=1
u
cN
i
u
cN
i 1
!
, I have
1X
t=0
 
tucNt
ucN0
!

 
cNt +
ucNt (1)
ucNt
 cNt (1) +
ucNt (2)
ucNt
 cNt (2) NN
!
= bN0 : (5)
Multiplying both sides of equation (5) by ucN0 , I obtain the implementability condition
1X
t=0
t 

ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN

= ucN0  bN0 : (6)
B Computation Algorithm
The following algorithm is used to solve the benchmark model.
1. Guess the Lagrangian multiplier  of the implementability condition (6).
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2. Given  and bN0 = 0, solve the following value function using value function iterations
and obtain the optimal decision rules:
V (HSt ;)
 max
24 u(CSt ) + ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN
+V (HSt+1;)
35 ;
subject to
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


;
N i = nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2); c
i
t = n
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg ;
cNt (z) + c
S
t (z) = A
N
t (z)n
N
t (z) + A
S
t (z)n
S
t (z);
ucNt (z)
ucNt
 1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z)  0; nSt (z)  0; z 2 f1; 2g ;
ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
ucNt (1)
ucNt (2)
:
3. Using the optimal decision rules, simulate for transition to steady state.
4. Check if the implementability condition (6) is satised. If not, go to Step 1 and repeat
the above procedure.
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Table 1: Parameter Values of the Benchmark Model Economy
Parameter Description
 = 0:96 Discount factor
1= = 0:5 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 = 0:2438 Expenditure share on traded goods
 = 0:5516 Expenditure share on the rst traded commodity ( )
 = 0:99 South human capital at the steady state
 
HN

NN = 1 The North countrys labor
NS = 1 The South countrys labor
bS0 = 0 The South countrys initial debt
HS0 = 0:5269 The South countrys initial human capital
HN = 19:8941 The North countrys human capital
 = 0:0522 Labor productivity in the second traded commodity production
 = 33:8838 Degree of learning-by-exporting
Table 2: Average of Aggregate Variables from 1991 to 2007 (Unit: %)
Variable Data Model
Growth rate of Chinas real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. 7:52 7:52
Chinas current account over GDP 3:12 10:61
U.S. current account over GDP  6:00  0:84
Chinas export over GDP 25:22 23:45
Appreciation rate of Chinas real exchange rate 1:46 9:27
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Table 3: Welfare Gain or Loss (Unit: Per-Period Consumption)
South North
Benchmark =) No Policy  19:12% +0:06%
Benchmark =) No WTO +14:05% +0:45%
Benchmark =) Coordinated Policy +13:16% +1:22%
No WTO =) Coordinated Policy  0:79% +0:78%
Table 4: Impact of Degree of Learning-by-Exporting
Variable (Unit: %) Data Degree of Learning-by-Exporting
Benchmark
(11:91)
8:82 1:30
Growth rate of
China rel. GDPPC
7:52 7:52 1:97 0:14
China CA over GDP 3:12 10:61 1:48  21:15
U.S. CA over GDP  6:00  0:84  0:06 0:58
China EX over GDP 25:22 23:45 17:15 3:16
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Figure 1: Chinas Exports and Economic Growth
Figure 2: Current Account Imbalances of U.S. and China
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Figure 3: Time Path of South Tax and Subsidy (Benchmark)
Figure 4: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark)
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Figure 5: Time Path of South Consumption, Export, and Import (Benchmark)
Figure 6: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark)
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Figure 7: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark and No-Policy)
Figure 8: Time Path of South Consumption, Export, and Import (Benchmark and No-Policy)
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Figure 9: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark and No-Policy)
Figure 10: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark and No-WTO)
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Figure 11: Time Path of South Consumption, Export, and Import (Benchmark and No-
WTO)
Figure 12: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark and No-WTO)
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Figure 13: Time Path of South Tax and Subsidy (Benchmark and No-WTO)
Figure 14: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark, No-WTO, and
Coordinated Policy)
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Figure 15: Time Path of South Consumption, Export, and Import (Benchmark, No-WTO,
and Coordinated Policy)
Figure 16: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark, No-WTO, and Coordinated
Policy)
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Figure 17: Time Path of South Tax and Subsidy (Benchmark, No-WTO, and Coordinated
Policy)
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